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This paper sheds light on the heavy financial burden on peasants in China’s fiscal 
decentralization system. Using a political economy framework, this paper explores the 
tax-farming nature of China’s fiscally decentralized system and examines why the system 
incurs a particularly heavy financial burden on peasants. Specifically, it points out that a 
political hierarchy financed by a tax-farming system in China, fails to contain the 
exploitative behavior of local officials, which results in the expenditure devolution and 
revenue centralization within the hierarchy. Ultimately, peasants bear the brunt of the tax 
burden. As the financial pressure of excessive levies and fees reaches a perilous point, 
peasants are resorting to violent protests. Unless a fiscally decentralized system with 
horizontal accountability mechanisms evolves, the country’s ability to sustain a 
centralized polity may become increasingly undermined. A case study of township 
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Peasants… are our brothers and sisters, but they are 
our under-privileged brothers and sisters.  
        --Lucian  Bianco  [2000] 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ding Zuoming, a young peasant from Luying village in Anhui’s Lixin County, 
learned  that the fees imposed by local officials were far too high by following Central 
Committee debates over reducing rural taxation on the radio. Ding led a delegation of 
peasants to the village Party committee, and drafted a series of letters appealing to higher 
authorities. However, he was charged with assaulting village cadres, and when he refuses 
to pay the fine, Ding was arrested by the village police, tortured, and beaten to death. The 
“Ding Zouming affair” was finally resolved by the arrival of a Central Committee team 
and a stipulated compensation to Ding’s family. However, after eight years his family 
had still not been paid and his children had to leave school early to support the 
impoverished family (as reported in Chen and Wu’s [2004] enlightening book Survey on 
Chinese Peasants).  
The massive financial burden (nongmin fudan) on peasants is not unique to 
Luying village, but affects 900 million farmers nationwide. The issue of nongmin fudan, 
which began to surface in the late 1980s, has landed at the center of China politics as the 
increase in the charges paid by peasants to local authorities is threatening the social 
stability in the countryside. The soaring skyscrapers, spreading highways, lavish five-star 
hotels, and luxurious nightclubs and Karaoke bars, are forged on a foundation of sacrifice,   3
sweat and toil of hundreds and thousands of peasants. A growing literature in recent years 
has documented the deteriorating situation in the countryside.
1  
The peasants were paying, as they put it, “more taxes than there are hairs on a 
cow.” In addition to the agricultural tax that China has been collecting for 2,600 years, 
each township and village government adds “three deductions and five charges” 
(xiangtongchou he cun tiliu
 ). The “three deductions” collected by village are for 
collective investment, public welfare funds, and cadre compensation; and the “five 
charges” levied by townships, include charges for rural education, family planning, 
militia training, rural road construction and maintenance, and subsidies to entitled groups 
[Bernstein and Lü 2000, p. 744]. Township governments operate in a policy vacuum 
without any mechanism of accountability and transparency or system of controls from 
below.  
The severe financial burden on farmers has resulted in numerous peasant riots in 
the past fifteen years. The peasant riots of 1992 rivaled those in 1949, and have not yet 
subsided [Bernstein 1999, Bernstein and Lü 2000, Bernstein 2002, and Bianco 2001]. In 
2004 the government recorded 74,000 cases of rural unrest [Ang 2006]. The rural revolts 
were mainly triggered by resistance “not just to the increase of the overall tax burden, but 
also to the number of taxes and various supplementary charges and levies that are 
imposed haphazardly and even illegally, in order to fund, or under the pretext of funding, 
some particular project or other” [Bianco 2001, 248-249].
2  
                                                 
1 For example, Li Changping’s Telling the Prime Minister the Truth and He Qinglian’s Modernization’s 
Pitfall, and Chen Guidi and Wu Chuntao’s Survey of Chinese Peasants. 
2 This conclusion of the causes of peasant revolts is also shared by Bernstein and Lü [2000, p. 742-63].    4
Aware of the conventional wisdom that “the water can make the boat float, but it 
can sink it too,” China’s central leadership has paid close attention to the issue of peasant 
burden, and since the early 1990s a series of measures were taken to tackle the problem. 
As early as 1990 the State Council issued an “announcement” (tongzhi) and made a 
“decision” (jueding) regarding the “peasants’ burden” problem. “Regulations on Peasant 
Burden and Labor” in 1991 limited the “three deductions” and “five charges” paid to the 
village and township to no more than 5 percent of a household’s net income [Aubert and 
Li 2002]. In 1996 the State Council sent top officials to Henan, Hunan, Hubei, Anhui and 
Shanxi provinces to ensure that the tax reduction was being properly implemented. And 
in May 1997, four more documents on the peasant burden problem were issued. In 2003, 
the rural Tax-for-Fee reform made its national debut, aimed at abolishing agricultural 
taxes and innumerable charges.  
The current leadership is increasingly attentive to the grievances from the 
countryside, and has been talking about building a harmonious society, steering away 
from a blind pursuit of growth and paying close attention to the well-being of the people. 
It represents a shift in the party’s thinking. As China is keen on developing “a new 
socialist countryside”, a major goal of the new five-year economic program, a series of 
favorable polices will be implemented to completely rescind the agricultural tax, provide 
free rural compulsory education, strengthen new rural insurance schemes, promote 
modern agriculture, shift the government’s priority in infrastructure investment to the 
countryside, and further county and township fiscal management systems [Wen 2006].    5
However, the reality is that decisions announced in Beijing are frequently not 
fully implemented in counties, towns and villages. Up to now, the peasant burden seems 
far from resolved in spite of Chinese leaders’ escalating rhetoric of alleviating peasants’ 
financial burdens and the dutiful propaganda slogans adorning walls in the countryside: 
“For the People” or “The People Work for Themselves”. Before the tax-for-fee reform, 
the official restrictions limiting rural fees to no more than 5 percent of local per-capita 
household net income were commonly ignored [China Development Brief 2000 and 
Keidel 2005]. In 2005, a quarter government revenues paid the salaries and expenses of 
the 6 million officials at all levels, including banquets, chauffeured cars and trips abroad 
as well as salaries [Cody 2006]. It remains to be seen whether the comprehensive rural 
reform promoted in the new five-year plan will significantly improve the situation for 
peasants. 
This paper sheds light on the impact of fiscal decentralization on the excessive 
peasants’ financial burdens in China. Fiscal decentralization has been a central 
component of China’s economic policy since the opening-up and economic reform was 
initiated in 1978.  Under the fiscal contract system (1980-93), tax collection was 
localized. Each level of subnational government contracted with the immediately 
subordinate level for revenue sharing either by proportion or a fixed quota with a 
percentage rate. The terms of the contract were determined by negotiations between 
various levels of governments.  
The tax-sharing reform in 1994 replaced the fiscal contract system with a tax 
assignment system, which for the first time explicitly defines central, shared, and local   6
taxes between the Center and provinces. The tax collection was also split into central and 
provincial administrations, with the former collecting central and shared taxes and the 
latter collecting provincial taxes.  
Under the fiscal contract system China experied unprecedented economic growth. 
Those who attributed the remarkable economic performance to fiscal decentralization 
argued that the material gains (fiscal retention) derived from the fiscal contracts with the 
Center (or an upper echelon) motivated subnational government officials to spearhead the 
reform [Oi 1992]. Others credit fiscal decentralization with restraining the Center’s 
predatory behavior, enhancing subnational governments’ accountability, and tightening 
budget constraints [Qian and Weingast 1997; Qian 1998; Qian 1999]. Theoretical 
arguments that fiscal decentralization improved allocative efficiency and enhanced 
subnational governments’ accountability were overshadowed by the reality of subnational 
governments’ protectionist behavior that often led to “backward specialization” and 
reducing allocative efficiency and softening budget constraints, which actually hindered 
macroeconomic stability and regional economic growth [Yang 1997; Steinfeld 1999; 
Young 2000].  
These conflicting observations suggest a series of questions: why local officials’ 
entrepreneurship and their enhanced accountability did not result in allocative efficiency 
and an optimized economic structure that would further facilitate economic growth? 
Where and how had the entrepreneurship of local officials been diverted? To whom were 
local officials accountable? And to what extent do the answers to these questions shed 
light on the phenomenon of “local officials drive the people to rebel” (guan bi min fan) in 
China’s countryside?    7
This paper reconciles the contradictory observations of the effects of fiscal 
decentralization by arguing that fiscal decentralization in China is by nature tax farming, 
an incentive structure that dictates the behavior pattern of local agents. The behavioral 
patterns of local officials show that they pursue their parochial interests and self 
enrichment over enforcing central policies, which leads to economic and social 
consequences including the unbearable financial burdens on peasants.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I examines the tax-farming nature of 
China’s fiscally decentralized system and analyzes why such a fiscal system is the source 
of heavy financial burden on peasants. It also compares the contemporary fiscally 
decentralized system in China with its historical counterparts to show how they differ and 
why they stay much the same.  Section II lays out the economic and social consequences 
of the tax-farming fiscal system in a case study of government finance at township level, 
the lowest bureaucratic echelon dealing directly with peasants. Section III discusses the 
political consequences of such a fiscal system and analyzes possible policy alternatives. 
Section IV concludes.     
II. TAX FARMING: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
II.A  Tax Farming in Theory 
This section examines how fiscal decentralization started in 1980 in China and 
how this practice fits into the configuration of tax farming. By definition, tax farming is 
“a system wherein the right to collect certain taxes [from a given region] owned by the 
state is auctioned off to the highest bidder” [Stella 1993, p. 217]. The tax farmer (the tax-
collecting agent) pays the bidding price (usually a lump sum) to the national treasury and   8
“the difference between that sum and the sum actually collected represented his profit or 
loss.”
3 A truly competitive auction signals the profitability of sectors to which the 
auctioned tax applies [Çizakça 1989]. In other words, if the auction on tax farming rights 
was perfectly competitive, the price of tax collection rights would exactly measure the 
true cost of efficient tax collection. While, in theory, tax farming could be an efficient 
mechanism of public finance, in practice it has rarely if ever operated in a transparent and 
competitive fashion as the state desired. For example, during the Roman Empire, the 
Censor at Rome auctioned the tax-collecting contracts every five years and fixed the 
remittance at the initial auction price, but “not much [else] was known about these 
auctions, which may not have been open auctions at all” [Balsdon 1962]. The 
competitiveness of the auction is also undermined when the retention permitted to the 
regional agents (after remittance to the Center) is earmarked for specific central mandates. 
For example, in the Ottoman Empire for the period from 1520 to 1697 A.D., the prices of 
tax farming, which were earmarked for paying the salaries of the military, were either 
stagnant or frozen.
 4 Under these circumstances, the bidding process was replaced by 
negotiations between the Center and its local military agents. The amount turned over to 
the Center fluctuated widely over time; the military agreed to pay a higher share to the 
Center (or the Center succeeded in increasing the share) in some years and bargained to 
reduce such dues in others [Çizakça 1993]. Negotiations and renegotiations of the 
contracted amount pervaded the entire system of the Ottoman Empire [Darling 1996].  In 
                                                 
3 Columbia Encyclopedia, 6
th ed., s.v. “tax farming.”  
4 Generally in a competitive bidding process, the “prices” should have been bid up over a long period of 
time regardless of short-term shocks that could have temporarily prevented the bidding prices from going 
up.   9
other cases, such as in the Roman Empire, tax-collecting companies were “strong enough 
to force the Senate to reduce the sum bid by a third” [Balsdon 1962].  
A practical definition of tax farming should incorporate the fact that the bidding 
process is the second nature of this revenue generation mode. Hence, tax farming is a 
revenue generation system mediated through a middleman (tax farmer) who “stands 
between the landlord or state and the serf-tenants” [Fadl 1992]. The tax farmer pledges to 
pay a fixed amount to the state (or the land owner) and then remunerates himself through 
extra levies placed on the serf-tenants [Fadl 1992].  
Tax farming was used in republics like the Roman Empire, and authoritarian 
regimes such as Pharoic Egypt, ancient China, and the Ottoman Empire. Tax farming was 
also extensively practiced in early modern Europe and colonized Southeast Asia before 
the 20
th century [Copland and Godley 1993, and Reid 1993]. It tends to be a relatively 
effective method of revenue generation when agriculture is the dominant production 
mode in a vast geographic area and the bureaucratic institutional setting is modest.  
First, tax farming carried low risk for the Center [Çizakça 1989].  In the pre-
modern history taxes were mostly levied on land and people in the form of physical 
goods because it was more important for a ruler to ensure the state’s proportion against a 
volatile agricultural output than to maximize its revenue proportionately against total 
output, as in the modern times.  In recognition of the state’s fiscal prioritization, a 
regional tax farmer committed to remit a fixed amount of revenue to the Center, often in 
the forms of crops. Given that crop production depends on the weather, tax farmers 
carried the risk of revenue loss during poor harvests (lower tax collection than the 
contracted amount to the Center). Although tax farming ensured central revenue and   10
devolved risks associated with revenue loss to the local agents or tax farmers, such 
assurance was (and is) achieved at a high transaction cost—the tax farmer retains all 
revenue that exceeds his obligation to the Center when the harvest is successful. By 
fixing the “price” paid to the Center on nominal terms and sometimes for several years, 
tax farming attributes the residual revenue generated from the expansion of the economy 
to the party that controls tax collection in the long run, although it also bears the burden 
of a shrinking residual in waning years. In other words, while permitting a level of fiscal 
predictability---in that the Center is more equipped to establish nationwide annual 
budgets when tax remittances are minimally set---the tax-farming system carries low tax 
buoyancy; tax generation in such a system tends to be inelastic with respect to income 
growth. To the Center, “the purpose of farming the taxes was evidently no more than to 
obtain a secure cash basis for the state budget by ensuring a minimum income in 
currency” [Weber 1976, p. 62].  
Second, rulers chose tax-farming policy when there was an “inability to construct 
an elaborated state bureaucracy” to undertake the task of revenue collection in an 
extensive geographic area or when there was a “calculation that tax farming could be 
more efficient than a state bureaucracy in securing revenues” [Levi 1988, p. 72]. The 
benefit of tax farming for the central government lay in acquiring revenue in a cost-
saving manner while sparing the Center from footing the costs of revenue collection 
[Stella 1993]. 
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II.B  Tax Farming during China’s Dynastic Era 
The tax-farming structure in imperial China was characterized by bargaining 
between the Center and its bureaucratic agents. Tax collectors were not independent 
agents but government bureaucracies located at subnational levels. The central and 
provincial governments shared the revenue in a fixed sum. The Center granted the 
residual amount above the agreed remittance level to compensate subnational government 
officials. Such an arrangement gave local bureaucratic agents complete control over tax 
collection and revenue information, and enabled these agents to better utilize tax 
collection as (1) a lever to falsify the budgets against the Center and (2) an instrument to 
exploit taxpayers.  
For several centuries before the Qin Dynasty (221 B.C.–206 B.C.), the Imperial 
Court relied on tributes from the provinces governed by feudal princes, whose aristocratic 
origins ensured that their local officials were independent from the Court [Webber and 
Wildavsky 1986, p. 61]. Throughout feudalism, the recruitment of government officials 
became increasingly institutionalized. During the Han Dynasty (207 B.C.), 
recommendations and examinations still favored candidates from upper-class families. 
This situation was gradually replaced by a more egalitarian system ensured by nationwide 
gentry examinations at various academic levels beginning in the Tang Dynasty, 618 
A.D.). Literate, bureaucratic careerists have administered China’s tax system ever since 
[Hucker 1987]. In due course, the political structure of China also evolved from 
feudalism to centralized monism run by a bureaucratic hierarchy [Hucker 1987].  
The bureaucratizing process that began during the Qin and Han Dynasties (221 
B.C.-220 A.D.) was realized via a relatively successful transformation of feudal princes   12
and aristocrats from being landlords of their own fiefs to being landowners that held 
offices with authority to collect taxes under their jurisdiction [Wang 1980; Weber 1976; 
and Huang 1999]. This transformation ensured the success of bureaucratization and 
nominal centralization, incorporated tax farming into the remuneration system of the 
entire officialdom, and ensured payment at each hierarchical level. The Center succeeded 
in constructing an elaborate bureaucracy without having to pay local agents. Rather, local 
agents subsidized themselves by reserving a proportion of the payments-in-kind collected 
on behalf of the emperor or by simply remunerating themselves for their services (e.g., 
rice, silk, etc.). For example, from the time of the Three Kingdoms (220 A.D.-265 A.D.) 
to the early Jin Dynasty (265 A.D.-420 A.D.), the salaries of officials were extremely low 
with periodical breaks due to financial difficulties at the Center. Civil officials relied on 
random grants, and military officials depended on robbery [Huang 1999, pp. 149-151]. 
This situation was often repeated at the turn of dynasties.
5  As the fiscal system became 
increasingly decentralized to appease the regional powers during the Sui (581 A.D.-618 
A.D.) and Tang Dynasty (618 A.D.-906 A.D.), the cadre of bureaucrats expanded at an 
alarming rate, which tremendously exacerbated financial burdens at various government 
levels [Huang 1999, pp. 157-202]. When the Center faced increasing financial constraints, 
Yang Yan, the Chancellor of the Emperor Dezong, introduced a tax reform in 780 A.D. 
to balance the government’s budget.  
One of the most important principles of this reform period was to set local tax 
levels based on total government financial needs.
6  Should the government be incapable 
                                                 
5 For details, see Huang [1999]. 
6 See Jiu Tang Shu: Yang Yan Zhuan (Old Tang Book: Biography of Yang Yan), quoted in ibid, pp. 176.    13
of controlling the growth of its spending, which was a typical problem of an authoritarian 
regime [Wildavsky 1985], indeed ordinary people had to bear the brunt of the tax burden. 
As a result, various levies and corvée impoverished the society, forced people to leave 
their hometowns, and even spurred rampant collective tax resistance [Huang 1999]. This 
phenomenon often repeated itself as each dynasty came to an end.
7  The Song Dynasty 
(960 A.D.-1279 A.D.) witnessed rapid development of commerce and market economy, 
and the collection of taxes on markets was sold to tax farmers who were usually wealthy 
enough to pay the franchise and colluded with local officials to exploit merchants and 
farmers [Huang 1999]. The armed forces in the Song Dynasty, like the Ottoman Empire, 
were also financed by local taxes and surcharges franchised to the military [Huang 1999]. 
The Song Dynasty maintained a highly centralized fiscal system in nominal terms, but by 
the end of the Southern Song, local governments were not only incapable of remitting 
revenue to the Center, but also relied on subsidies from the Center. The same 
fundamental disadvantage of a centralized fiscal system with its dampened incentives for 
local tax collection was evident during the first 30 years of the People’s Republic since 
1949.  
By the time of the Ming Dynasty (1368 A.D.-1644 A.D.), the excessive 
surcharges on land for funding military resistance to invasions by northern minority 
groups resulted in unbearable tax burdens. During protests against excessive tax burdens, 
Li Zicheng led large-scale peasant revolts, and then joined forces with external invaders 
to overthrow the rulers of the Ming Dynasty. 
                                                 
7 For details, see Ibid.    14
China’s multi-layered hierarchical bureaucracy was maintained at a high 
transaction cost to the Center: state officials at each echelon staked their claim on the 
revenue, leaving little for the Center [Webber and Wildavsky 1983, p.83]. On one hand, 
increasing devolution of central expenses was inevitable and officials were forced to 
further squeeze taxpayers through surcharges and fees to bear all central mandates and 
administrative costs. On the other hand, the motivation of local official tax farmers in 
mobilizing revenues from local sources for the use of the Center depended on the 
freedom they possessed to extract revenues [Weber 1978, p. 965]. Therefore, “At each 
step of the tax collection—local, provincial, and national—each official extracted 
irregular, extralegal payments from taxpayers. This combination of fee-for-service and 
institutionalized bribery became a regular feature of Chinese financial administration” 
[Weber 1978, p. 83]. This situation remained until the last day of Imperial China—the 
Qing Dynasty (1644 A.D.-1911 A.D) [Hsü 1969].  
During the Republic of China (1911-49), a process of centralization aimed at 
increasing state revenues (for both military and civilian purposes), relied on an increasing 
number of tax farmers and mercenary soldiers [Duara 1987]. From 1911 to 1927, 
surcharges were used as exclusive local revenues. For instance, Jiangsu Province had 105 
categories of land surcharges and Zhejiang Province maintained 74. Revenue from 
surcharges was 31 times the land tax in Guanyu county, Jiangsu Province, and 26 times 
the land tax in Haimen [Chen 1936, p. 239]. “The inexorable process of the state’s 
intrusion into and extraction from local society led to violent local protests, which 
contributed to growing anarchy in local society as the Chinese state power expanded to 
the rural China” [Duara 1987, p. 132].    15
In a measure to revamp the fiscal system, the Nationalist Party (Guomindang) 
clarified central and provincial revenue sources, but left the provincial government to 
decide on revenue distribution to subordinate levels of government. As a result, counties 
receiving unfunded mandates from provinces (jiao chai bu jiao fei) managed to meet 
their hierarchical obligations by charging fees [Huang 1999, p. 442]. Between July 1934 
and August 1935, over 5,000 levies were abolished, but equivalent number of new levies 
appeared, as reported by Finance Minister Kong Xiangxi at the Sixth Plenum of the 
National Party [Huang 1999, p. 448]. 
Tax farming, on the one hand, enabled the central government to operate the 
empire in a cost-saving manner by delegating revenue collection as well as its associated 
costs to the regions. The Center financed state operations by devolving administrative 
costs down to local taxpayers through cascading expenditure mandates to lower echelons. 
In addition, when the official’s personal reward was proportional to the amounts 
collected, tax farming might also increase national revenue [Webber and Wildavsky 
1986]. Given the nature of imperial officials’ remuneration based partly on their personal 
initiatives and the retention of any surplus beyond the amount collected for the Center, 
the system had a built-in inducement for rent-seeking behavior. This is “because when 
the state abrogates control over minor officials, it must condone excessive zeal in 
collection of fees, and close its eyes when officials take bribes or commit other 
irregularities” [Webber and Wildavsky 1986, p. 133]. In other words, “although tax 
farming facilitates monitoring the outcome, it compounds the problem of monitoring the 
process. The greater the decentralization, the more difficult it is to monitor the process 
and achieve accountability” [Stella 1993, p. 219].     16
The implementation bias of subnational agents became a systematic byproduct of 
the incentives created by the tax-farming system that “rewarded” the bureaucrats/tax 
farmers who abused the system for parochial or personal gains. This undesirable outcome 
of the tax-farming system lies at the heart of the principal-agent relationship that dictates 
the financial flows of tax revenue. Tax farming could be a private solution to revenue 
generation only when tax farmers operated “at the point where private marginal revenue 
equals private marginal cost,” [Stella 1993, p. 217]. This optimal solution was only 
possible when tax farmers bore the full cost of revenue collection. In practice, however, 
the cost of revenue collection could be and actually was passed on to the taxpayers and 
the Center. The problem lay in the split of the property rights over taxation: the Center 
had the ownership over all tax bases, while the agents had effective control over profit-
making on the same tax bases through the revenue production processes. Bureaucratic tax 
farmers, therefore, had no interest in preserving the tax bases, to which they had no claim 
whatsoever. They tended to maximize their income by reducing the remitted amount to 
the Center and maximizing the revenue they actually collected through exploitative 
practices.  Consequently, the expansion of a bureaucratic system for tax collection was 
almost inevitable. This was by all means not exclusive to China’s Dynastic cases. For 
example, the syndicate of tax collectors in Ancient Rome and seventeenth century France 
employed so many tax collectors that it more than replicated inefficient government 
bureaucracy and directly contributed to the worsening of already restrained government 
finance [Webber and Wildavsky 1986, and Collins 1988].  
As manifested by the vicissitudes of Chinese dynastic history, the decline of a 
regime financed by tax farming is inescapable because the state’s own capacity of   17
controlling and exploiting the revenue resources was abused by the unfettered discretion 
granted to the local officials or the official tax farmers [Webber 1978]. The vital financial 
resources that the center politically and economically relied on were progressively 
pocketed by regional tax farmers, which in turn enhanced the bargaining power of 
localities.
8 Max Weber summarizes the economic consequence of tax farming as follows 
[Weber 1978, p. 199]: 
A state which collects money taxes by tax farming is a favorable environment for 
the development of politically oriented capitalism,
9 but it does not encourage the 
orientation of profit-making activities to the market. The granting of rights to 
contributions and their distribution as benefices normally tends to check the 
development of [market] capitalism by creating vested interests in the 
maintenance of existing sources of fees and contributions. It thus tends to 
stereotyping and traditionalizing of the economic system.  
 
Consequently, “the long-run historical tendency set in motion by political 
capitalism is in the direction of feudal- or patriarchal-type economic structures” [Love 
1986]. 
A financially restrained central government coupled with exploitative local agents 
may lead to insidious consequences.  The empire may either be restrained or ultimately 
dismantled because “its agents continually ‘disappear’ into civil society, bearing the 
state’s resources with them” [Mann 1984]. The exploitative practices of tax farmers 
might also propel those being over-taxed to political opposition, which eventually leads 
to political and social instability—as Max Weber observed [Weber 1978, p. 965]: 
                                                 
8 For a discussion on the trade-off between transaction costs and relative bargaining power, see Margaret 
Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 17-29. 
9 “Political capitalism” is used by Weber ([1968], 1978) to describe “non-market types of profit making” 
[Love, 1986]. Love [1986] interprets the term as a system within which profits are directly derived from the 
political domain rather than from the expansion of markets that are driven by the commercial activities 
intends to satisfy the demand for consumption.    18
The control and full exploitation of the fiscal resources for the lord’s own use is 
surrendered and perhaps, depending upon the measure of freedom left to the 
official or the office- or tax-farmer, the long-run yield capacity even endangered 
by ruthless exploitation, since a capitalist [tax farmer] will not have the same 
long-run interest in preservation of the subjects’ ability to pay as the political lord. 
 
In contrast to other ancient empires, where tax farming was practiced in the form 
of central government licensing the right of certain taxes collection to private bidders, 
Imperial China merged the business of farming taxes into the Imperial bureaucracy.  This 
was a significant institutional invention resulting, in part, from the increasingly 
institutionalized bureaucratic system since the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.).   
The most distinctive feature was the hierarchy of cascading authority within the 
bureaucracy—each level of bureaucracy exercised discretion and authority to farm the 
taxes of the adjacent subordinate level.  In such a structure the burden of taxation was 
inevitably pushed downward to individual taxpayers.  This bureaucratic tax-farming 
system, whereby one level of government was empowered to farm the tax revenue of the 
adjacent lower level, gives rise to two potential consequences.  One is that the 
bureaucratic tax-farming system could make tax farmers more interested in preserving 
the political regime upon which their careers depend.  Hence their benefits in preserving 
the tax base in the long run could be consistent with that of their political lord—the 
central government.  The other outcome is a tendency of bureaucratic tax farmers to 
perform additional administrative functions that amplified the need for extra revenue and 
tax power. This outcome implies enhanced motive and capacity to exploit taxpayers, 
which in turn increases the risk of revolts by taxpayers against the central government. 
An examination of China’s dynastic past supports the proposition. Thus China’s long-
standing history of peasant revolutions provoked by extortionate levies which often   19
resulted in the overhaul of the existing dynasty demonstrates that the modus operandi of 
bureaucratic tax farmers in China was not fundamentally different from those in other 
regimes in history.  While a typical tax- farming system designed to “franchise 
unprincipled individuals to exploit the peasantry unchecked,” may have contributed to the 
decline of, for example, the Ottoman Empire [Darling 1996, p. 119], 
 Chinese 
bureaucratic tax farmers, with their careers dependent on the regime, were supposed to 
have enhanced behavioral compliance with institutional and ethical constraints that 
individual tax farmers in other regimes might be free of. However, as long as the 
ownership of economic resources was separate from the control over profit-making on 
the same resources—where the former belonged to the Center and the latter to the 
agents—bureaucratic tax farmers would not be encouraged to encompass the interest of 
the Center as their own.  In this respect, tax farmers, be they bureaucrats or individuals, 
are identical in their pursuit for personal gains at the expense of the Center. The 
bureaucratic element of the Chinese tax-farming system by itself failed to restrain 
officials’ behavior of maximizing self-interests.   
Historically, rulers usually believed that “promoting ideology may reduce the 
costs of enforcement” [Levi 1988, p. 52], provided that there was no free-rider problem.
10 
But the free-rider problem could be and was prevalent in the tax-farming system. It was 
believed by bureaucratic tax farmers that their individual compliance with the moral code 
in the face of utility-maximizing behavior on the part of others could not save the regime. 
Rather, following the herd was the only way to survive.  In China’s political culture, the 
                                                 
10 Douglass C. North [1985, p. 394] measures ideological compliance by “the premium people are willing 
to incur not to free ride.”     20
moral code fashioned on the model of uncorrupted officials only reflected the fact that 
such examples were rare in reality [Solomon 1971]. The pan-moralization of Confucian 
ethics on gentry values was therefore ineffective in ideologically enhancing the 
compliance of bureaucratic tax farmers.  
Under a unitary hierarchical system, the choice of local officials was also 
limited—to obey hierarchical mandates and prevail or defy and become marginalized. 
The choice by most officials to remain in the officialdom fundamentally explains an 
unchecked central government and its unrestrained spending expansion. Given each 
echelon with a lowerarchy had the propensity to devolve expenditures, the echelon at the 
bottom had no choice but to pass the financial pressure directly onto taxpayers, or 
peasants. These taxpayers, in the absence of any institutionalized form of political 
participation, could only resort to violent expression when they were no longer able to 
stand the financial burdens.  
 
II.C  Fiscal Reforms of the First Phase (1980-93) 
A highly centralized tax system dominated the first 30 years of the People’s 
Republic (1949-79). During this period, the central government had exclusive say on 
revenue
11 and most of the expenditures. Subnational tax administrations, as the Center’s 
agents, collected and remitted all taxes to the Center. Expenditures at subnational level 
were mainly financed by central transfers, complemented by a few self-retained local tax 
receipts.   
                                                 
11 The Center had sole discretion over what revenues were to be collected and at what rates.    21
The highly centralized pre-reform fiscal system (before 1980) was rigid, with 
little incentives installed to spur local tax collection and promote efficient use of revenues. 
It became a major concern of the central authorities as the opening up and economic 
reform made its national debut in the late 70s. In the first phase of fiscal reforms (1980-
93), revenue was decentralized, with the provincial authorities still collecting all taxes, in 
the form of negotiated contracts with the Center. The contracts defined provincial 
revenue-remittance targets, which ensured financial flow to the Center. The Center 
allowed provinces to reserve any residual amount that exceeded the contracted remittance 
to the Center to remunerate themselves for (1) superior regional economic performance, 
and (2) assiduous tax collections.  
Provincial governments thus acted as the de facto broker between the Center and 
subprovincial administrative units (e.g., municipalities, provincial state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), etc.) to ensure that revenue-remittance targets were met on the one 
hand and on the other hand they made profits by extra levies on the same tax bases. 
During this period, the Center ended up making contracts that varied from one province 
to another. Expenditure was also decentralized under the circumstance that the 
subnational governments also had the discretion of spending the retained revenue. In the 
meantime, provincial governments were required to supplement the shared revenues by 
their self-generated income to balance their own expenditures [Wong 1991].  
Apart from negotiating with the Center over sharing terms in order to reserve as 
much as possible, the provinces enjoyed exclusive control over tax collection, which 
enabled them to act strategically to escape sharing their revenues with the Center through 
the following ways: (1) transferring budgetary to extra-budgetary revenues, which were   22
under the sole control of local governments; (2) granting generous tax concessions to 
local enterprises so that benefits could be accrued within the enterprises in the 
jurisdiction of subnational governments; (3) duplicating small and medium-sized SOEs 
(under the jurisdictions of subnational governments, where the income taxes go); and (4) 
establishing Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to expand subnational tax bases to the 
detriment of the Center [Wong 1991, World Bank 1989, World Bank 1993, World Bank 
1995, Bahl and Wallich 1992, and Bahl 1999]. In the bargaining process throughout the 
1980s, the provincial governments progressively derived fiscal autonomy from the Center. 
For example, the share of financial resource at the discretion of the central government 
declined from 54.3 percent in 1980 to 28.3 percent in 1993.
12  
At the same time, the Center granted provinces the discretion to structure their 
fiscal relations with the adjacent level in a similar fashion, which indeed opened the door 
for provinces to exploit their subordinate levels of government. Hence, an underlying 
agreement between the Center and provinces was that the Center would often turn a blind 
eye to the behavior of excessive collections and irregularities [Webber and Wildavsky 
1986, p. 133]. The Center therefore faced the same dilemma as the rulers in the dynastic 
era of “whether the central government was keener to punish corrupt local authorities or 
to extend its own control over them” [Bianco 2001, p. 89].  
The fiscal contract system did not define expenditure responsibilities for different 
levels of governments. In response to revenue constraints, governments at a higher level 
could devolve expenditures to lower levels along the hierarchy. As a result, government 
expenditures were passed downward, with a disproportionate share of spending needs, 
                                                 
12 See China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2000), p. 268.    23
including economic development, infrastructure investment, and social services, fell on 
local governments.  
 




The 1994 fiscal reform replaced fiscal contracts with a tax assignment system, 
under which taxes were reassigned (by tax category) into central and provincial exclusive 
taxes and shared taxes. In addition, tax collection was split into central and subnational 
administration, with the former collecting central and shared taxes and the latter 
subnational exclusive taxes.
13   
This reform focused only on (1) the revenue side, as manifested by the emphasis 
on raising the share of total government revenue in GDP, and (2) centralizing government 
revenues toward the Center, as manifested by the emphasis on raising the share of central 
revenue in total government revenue. 
Revenue assignments. The tax assignment was by and large congruent to the 
principles advocated by fiscal federalism scholars.
14  The Center succeeded in assigning 
itself the most stable and the largest tax categories, albeit only in nominal terms in the 
transition period (immediately after 1993).  
However, the 1994 reform reassigned revenue only between the Center and 
provinces. Each level of subnational government was, again, authorized to structure its 
intergovernmental fiscal relations with the adjacent tier of government in the same 
                                                 
13 For a detailed assessment of the 1994 tax assignment reform at its initial stage, see Wang [1997].  
14 For the details of the principle of revenue assignments, see Musgrave [1983].   24
fashion.
15 If we assume that government is a monolithic entity that systematically seeks 
maximum fiscal revenues [Brennan and Buchanan 1980], then this administrative latitude 
allowed each level of subnational governments the potential to exploit the next level 
down in the same fashion it was exploited by its superior by assigning itself the most 
stable and largest portion of revenue. As such, this reform legitimated the tax exploitation 
on lowerarchies, which was not fundamentally different from tax farming in a multilevel 
government hierarchy. 
Expenditure assignment. Conventional wisdom of fiscal federalism also provides 
that the assignment of expenditure responsibilities at different levels of government must 
precede the assignment of revenue which should be guided by their respective spending 
requirements and cannot be determined in advance.   
Again, the 1994 reform did not clarify expenditure assignments between different 
levels of government. Although the central authority specified the framework that 
provincial budgets should follow, such guidance was given only in “principle” and was 
vague.
16 In addition, with progressive economic reform, the budgetary expenditures 
substantially shifted toward the public goods provisions (e.g., social services), which 
further drained local financial resources. The budgets of provincial governments became 
increasingly constrained in part due to the centralization efforts in revenue and in part due 
to the increasing spending mandates from the central authority. For example, the laws in 
agriculture, education, and science and technology all required subnational governments 
                                                 
15 This situation is analogous to the reform in 1930s and the fiscal contract regime (1980-93), under which 
each level of government in the system had discretionary power over the next lower level in structuring 
their intergovernmental fiscal relations—defining revenue sharing arrangements, specifying expenditure 
responsibilities, and directing transfers. 
16 Refer to the Budget Law of China, 1995.   25
to spend in these areas at an increase rate higher than that of governments’ current 
revenue [Wang and Zhang 1998].  
The problem of vague expenditure assignment has further implications in a 
multilevel government. “Hierarchies need something—a controlled lowerarchy—to set 
on top of” [Wildavsky 1985]. Analogous to the tax farming practice in the dynastic era, 
the hierarchical government structure in contemporary China still allows the cascading of 
expenditures top-down. Like the central government, provinces tend to devolve 
expenditure responsibilities to lower levels. Local fiscal stress is exacerbated and deficits 
are further devolved along the executive hierarchy. Under a reasonable assumption that 
each subnational government attempts to devolve some expenditure responsibilities to the 
adjacent level, the township level of government, at the bottom of this hierarchy, 
inevitably shoulders inappropriate portion of responsibilities and faces increasing 
pressures to spend. Thus, given revenues centralization and expenditure devolution, the 
financial difficulties of the lowest level of government, the townships, become extremely 
severe.  It is the lowest level of government where one can observe the essential 
exploitative nature of the system. This is why we address township finance in the next 
section.   
III. TOWNSHIP  FINANCE
17 
 
Below the 27 provinces and autonomous regions and four municipalities [Beijing, 
Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing (since 1996)], China has 333 prefectures and 282 
prefecture level cities, 2,861 county level units (counties and county level cities, and 
                                                 
17 All numbers are in the unit by thousand (unless otherwise specified) to be consistent with the numbers in 
tables used in this section.   26
county level city districts). Below the county level, there are 44,067 township and town 
governments.
18 Township is the basic administrative division in the vast countryside. 
From 1980 to 1984, township level governments gradually replaced people’s communes 
[Jacob 1985]. The responsibilities for finance and tax administration were also extended 
to this level in 1984 as part of the “nationwide effort to push the state’s revenue-capturing 
apparatus closer to rural people”. Also, it served as a material incentive to township 
government officials to prompt local revenue collections [Blecher and Shue 1996].   
Townships are financially starved throughout the country. Bai [2002] documented 
the fragile financial position of township governments in Yun’nan and Qinghai. The 
1,590 townships in Yun’nan in 2000 had an openly accepted financial deficit of 0.48 
billion yuan and a hidden deficit of 0.93 billion yuan. In 2000 townships in Qinghai 
province had a financial deficit of 160 million yuan, with an average deficit of 588 
thousand yuan for each township government.  
The data on township used in the following analysis represents a typical situation 
of township finance in Jiangsu province. The analysis is based on township budgets, 
1990-99. Data for 2000 and 2001 are budgeted figures, which can be a reference for the 
effects of central policy change, i.e., tax-for-fee reform (fei gai shui in 2001).  It should 
be noted that Jiangsu was one of the two possible case studies to examine the effects of 
the first round of fei gai shui. The other case was Anhui province. Fei gai shui was 
promulgated in April 2001,
19 but the implementation was halted shortly in June 
nationwide, due, in part, to the concern that the rural tax-for-fee policy would terminate 
                                                 
18 China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2004), p. 3.  
19 Source: “Shuifei Gaige Dashi Ji,” [Major Events in fei gai shui Reform], Jingji Cankao Bao [Economic 
Reference Daily], 27 April 2003.     27
the provision of some vital public goods traditionally sponsored by township 
governments via surcharges (e.g., nine-year obligatory education was financed by 
educational surcharges), and partly due to the strong resistance from township 
governments. Jiangsu at that time had already implemented fei gai shui before the Center 
called for the cessation of the policy.
 20 By 2006, agricultural tax, a tax that China has 
been collecting for 2,600 years, will be completely rescinded. Although the rural Tax-for-
Fee reforms are remarkably reducing the tax burden on farmers by eliminating 33.6 
billion yuan of agricultural tax and over 70 billion yuan in the form of “three village 
deductions and five township charges” (xiangtongchou he cun tiliu
 )
21 [Wen 2006], a 
majority of township governments, especially those highly dependent on agricultural 
taxes in poor areas, have to grapple with further weakened fiscal capacity. 
  
III. A  Township Expenditures 
A significant feature of township expenditure is the high percentage of 
administrative expense, in particular expenditures on personnel including payroll to 
teachers, cadres, and government employees. Another feature is the relatively high 
spending on entertainment (Zhaodai Fei), in particular for guest expenditures, in both 
rich and poor townships.  
                                                 
20 After a termination of two years, Fei gai shui was reintroduced in the spring of 2003, right after the 
completion of the 10
th National People’s Congress.  
21 The “three deductions” are collected by village: collective investment, public welfare funds, and cadre 
compensation. The “five charges” are levied by townships including charges for rural education, family 
planning, militia training, rural road construction and maintenance, and subsidies to entitled groups 
[Bernstein and Lü 2000, p. 744].    28
The following two tables show the total expenditures 1990-99 of the township we 
investigate.
22 The total payrolls to primary and middle school teachers
23, to cadres and 
government employees are actually budgetary spending. The table reveals its 
disproportionately increased share in budgetary spending (the lower part of Table 1). The 
total payroll consumed only 21.9 percent in 1990, but jumped to 71.7 percent in 1991. 
From 1994 to 1995, its share in budgetary expenditure increased from 55.7 percent to 86 
percent, due to the large increase in the number of people paid by the budget.  From the 
mid 1990s, total payrolls took more than three quarters of budgetary expenditure, and 
beginning in 1999, it consumed the full budgetary resources (100.6 percent) and reached 
as high as 144.6 percent in 2000 and 120.3 percent in 2001. The payroll had to be 
supplemented by non-budgetary resources. The payroll to primary and middle school 




                                                 
22 This township also reported the budgetary figures for 2000 and 2001, which will help to examine the 
effect of fei gai shui reform in 2001 on township budget. 
23 The policy of compensating rural teachers by township budget changed in 2001. All the remuneration of 
rural teachers is now covered by county budget.   29
Table 1   Township Expenditures (1990-2001) (Thousand Yuan) a/

















village retention Total salary
B. 
Number of 
people paid by 
budget Total payroll 
B.1





 Number of cadres 
work in town 
government units 
Payroll to government 
employees (incl.admini-
strative units)
1990 3284.3  1758.3 455.0  1071.0  16000 2410 385.6  1720 275.2 270 43.2
1991 1812.4 537.4  1275.0  1275.0  15600 2470  385.3  1870 291.7 340 53.0
1992 2857.8  1043.4 521.4  1293.0  21140 3060 646.9  1990 420.7 370 78.2
1993 3135.5  1264.0 558.0  1313.5  30510 2620 799.4  1840 561.4 320 97.6
1994 3817.0  1571.0 852.0  1394.0  31010 2820 874.5  1980 614.0 390 120.9
1995 4382.6 1659.2  1291.7  1431.7  31850 4480  1426.9  2250 716.6 650 207.0
1996 5673.7 1763.3  2356.9  1553.5  32120 4260  1368.3  2250 722.7 580 186.3
1997 7700.7 2043.1  2983.4  2674.2  35570 4450  1582.9  2240 796.8 790 281.0
1998 7557.6 2096.7  2786.7  2674.2  46230 4350  2011.0  2170 1003.2 760 351.3
1999 8998.7 3059.4  3265.1  2674.2  68540 4490  3077.4  2540 1740.9 680 466.1
2000 17242.6 5540.9  6877.5  4824.2  84790 9450  8012.7  3950 3349.2 1190 1009.0
2001 13562.7 8530.2  2431.5  2601.0  108000 9500  10260.0  3950 4266.0 1240 1339.2
                  
Year  
Percentage share of expenditure under 








Percentage share of corresponding payroll category in total 
payroll expenditure 
1990   53.5  13.9  32.6     21.9   15.7 81.8 2.5
1991   29.7  70.3  b/  70.3  -2.5   71.7   54.3 35.8 9.9
1992   36.5 18.2  45.2 35.5    62.0    40.3 52.2 7.5
1993   40.3 17.8  41.9 44.3    63.2    44.4 47.9 7.7
1994   41.2  22.3  36.5  1.6   55.7   39.1 53.2 7.7
1995   37.9  29.5  32.7 2.7   86.0   43.2 44.3 12.5
1996   31.1  41.5  27.4  0.8   77.6   41.0 48.4 10.6
1997   26.5 38.7  34.7 10.7    77.5    39.0 47.2 13.8
1998   27.7 36.9  35.4 30.0    95.9    47.8 35.4 16.8
1999   34.0 36.3  29.7 48.3    100.6    56.9 27.9 15.2
2000   32.1 39.9  28.0 23.7    144.6    60.4 21.4 18.2
2001   62.9 17.9  19.2 27.4    120.3    50.0 34.3 15.7
Note a/ Number of 2000 and 2001 and budgeted instead of actual figures.         
 
b/ This number indicates the combined share financed by extra-budgetary and Township general fund 
and village retention.          30
The lower part of Table 1 also shows the spending shares financed by different 
revenue source. For most of years in 1990s, the budgetary resources contributed to 
roughly one third of the total expenditures, with only 26.5 percent in 1997.  The share of 
extra-budgetary expenditure increased from 13.9 percent in 1990 to 41.5 percent in 1996 
and stabilized at a level close to 40 percent until 2000. Township general fund-raising 
and village retention dropped gradually from 45.2 percent in 1992 to 28 percent in 2000. 
The structure of financing changed dramatically in 2001 when the rural tax-for-fee 
reform was launched in Jiangsu.    
As the township government expanded and the number of teachers increased,
 24 
the payroll entitlements pushed all other expenditures off the budget. The non-payroll 
township expenditures were financed by either extra-budgetary sources or various levies 
collectively named as “township general fund and village retention” (xiangtongchou he 
cun tiliu). Table 2 summaries the expenditures other than payroll.  
The upper part of Table 2 shows the breakdown of township expenditures (other 
than payroll) by category and the lower part of the table shows the corresponding 
percentage share.  The most notable expenditure category is the spending on 
entertainment (Zhaodai fei), which is used for treating associated people and working 
units at a higher level of the hierarchy or of the same level, or sometimes just 
“entertaining” themselves. It is controlled by the exclusive discretion of township cadres, 
and its lack of transparency is regarded by the villagers as a symbol of corruption. It 
                                                 
24 As shown in Table 1, number of people paid by budget increased from 2820 in 1994 to 4480 in 1995, and 
from 4490 in 1999 to 9450 in 2000. Number of teachers also jumped in these two time periods.     31
increased rapidly and consumed an equivalent of around 50 percent of expenditure (other 
than payroll) throughout the 1990s.  
 
Table 2                 
  Township Expenditures by Category (Thousand Yuan) 




















































                  
1990  150.3   19.8  2.5  45 5     65 13  
1991  258.0   23.7  3.2  52.3 8.7 79.50   71.7 18.9  
1992  282.8   31  5  59 9.8     149 29  
1993  349.6   47  7.1  63 11     190.5 31  
1994  473.5   53  8.5  77 13     279 43  
1995  606.3   62  8.5  81   86.80   311 57  
1996  644.0   71.7  10.3  94 16     383 69  
1997  920.9   126.1  36  228.8       451 79  
1998  1001.3   126.1  36  228.8     48.40  473 89  
1999  1075.4   126.1  36  228.8     48.40  537 99.1  
2000  1498.8     59.9  400.8 62.6   48.40  783 144.1  
2001  460           100.00  288 72  300
                  
  Total   
Percentage share of corresponding expenditure category in total current expenditure 
(other than payroll)   
1990  100.0   13.2  1.7  29.9 3.3     43.2 8.6  
1991  100.0   9.2  1.2  20.3 3.4 30.8   27.8 7.3  
1992  100.0   11.0  1.8  20.9 3.5     52.7 10.3  
1993  100.0   13.4  2.0  18.0 3.1     54.5 8.9  
1994  100.0   11.2  1.8  16.3 2.7     58.9 9.1  
1995  100.0   10.2  1.4  13.4   14.3   51.3 9.4  
1996  100.0   11.1  1.6  14.6 2.5     59.5 10.7  
1997  100.0   13.7  3.9  24.8       49.0 8.6  
1998  100.0   12.6  3.6  22.9     4.8 47.2 8.9  
1999  100.0   11.7  3.3  21.3     4.5 49.9 9.2  
2000  100.0     4.0  26.7 4.2   3.2 52.2 9.6  
2001  100.0           21.7 62.6 15.7   
 
      32
Newspaper and magazine subscription is also a notable expenditure item in 
township budget. Annual newspaper and magazine subscription took 10 percent in total 
expenditure (other than payroll) in most of the 1990s.  There have been grievances by 
township leaders and villagers about subscription mandates, e.g., imposed by the party 
hierarchy (e.g., Renmin Ribao by Central Propaganda Ministry) or by the central or the 
provincial government. A township government had to subscribe to several newspapers 
and periodicals from each upper hierarchical level - county, prefecture/city, province, and 
the Center - all of which believed that having their designated messages delivered to the 
grassroots was instrumental to ensure their grip on power. Or the mandate of subscription 
is an exertion of authority itself. Entertainment expenditure, and newspaper and magazine 
subscription, accounting for a combined share of around 60 percent, are the two most 
disliked spending categories by the people.  
 The  tax-for-fee  reform  (Fei gai shui) initiated in 2001 forbids township 
governments from fund-raising activities and village retentions. As such, the budgeted 
extra-budgetary expenditure for 2001 reduced 4.446 million yuan and expenditures from 
township general fund-raising and village retention reduced 2.223 million yuan (Table 1, 
item A.2 and A.3). Although budgetary resources increased around 3 million yuan (Table 
1, item A.1), it still could not make up all the reductions from fund-raising and village 
retentions. The payroll continued to increase by about 2 million (from 8 million in 2000 
to 10.26 million in 2001). As a result, township government had to cut non-payroll 
expenditures in order to balance the budget for 2001. Table 2 shows that the budgeted   33
expenditure (net of payroll) was cut by more than 10 million yuan,
25 and some recurrent 
expenditures that traditionally assigned to township government (e.g., voluntary soldiers, 
people’s militia, five guaranteed family subsidies, and welfare of needy families) were 
totally cut to zero for 2001.  Although entertainment spending suffered the largest cut of 
half a million yuan (from 783 thousand to 288 thousand) and newspaper/magazine 
subscription was also cut by half (from 144.1 thousand to 72 thousand), their shares in 
total expenditure (net of payroll) increased respectively from 52.2 percent in 2000 to 62.6 
percent in 2001 and from 9.6 to 15.7 percent. The analysis suggests that the tax-for-fee 
reform in Jiangsu further weakened fiscal capacity of townships to the detriment of 
expenditures on vital social welfare.  
 
III.B Township  Revenues 
  
The revenue of townships can be broadly categorized into industrial/commercial 
taxes and agricultural taxes, the former are shared with county and the latter are usually  
assigned exclusive to townships designated to compensate township employees and 
finance public services. Townships considerably rely on agricultural taxes, extra-budget 
resources, and a variety of township and village charges on farmers. These funds, of 
course, lack transparency; there is no formal definition or statistics about rural fee 
charges. It is common for townships in poorer areas to impose heavier charges and fees 
on farmers in order to get ends meet, which seriously damaged the fairness of the 
                                                 
25 The budgeted sum of all expenditure categories other than payroll reduced from 1,499 thousand in 2000 
to 460 thousand in 2001 (Table 2).   34
distribution of tax burdens [Zhao 2004]. Township revenues by category from 1990 to 
2001 are illustrated in Table 3. 
 
Table 3                   













































1990  981.9  782.4   199.5   199.5   413.8   517.0   554.0  
1991 915.6  739.9  -5.4 175.7 -11.9 155.7 20.0 543.6 31.4 607.7 17.5  667.3  20.5
1992  1047.5  809.0 9.3  238.5  35.7 232.9 5.6 521.4 -4.1 615.0 1.2 678.0 1.6
1993  1156.0  909.0 12.4  247.0  3.6 247.0   582.0 11.6 481.0 -21.8  832.5 22.8
1994 1615.0  1039.0  14.3 567.0 129.6 550.0 17.0 852.0 46.4 598.0 24.3  796.0  -4.4
1995 1818.5  1228.2  18.2 583.3  2.9 549.3 34.0 1290.2 51.4 637.0 6.5  794.7  -0.2
1996  2575.0  1721.0 40.1  829.0 42.1 781.0 48.0 2356.9 82.7 589.7 -7.4  963.8 21.3
1997  2897.8  2043.8 18.8  829.0  0.0 781.0 48.0 2983.4 26.6 1066.1 80.8 1608.1 66.8
1998  3168.6  2314.6  13.2  833.0 0.5 781.0 52.0 2786.7 -6.6 1066.1 0.0  1608.1 0.0
1999  3536.8  2617.8  13.1  888.0 6.6 781.0 107.0 3265.1 17.2 1066.1 0.0  1608.1 0.0
2000  7037.5  5423.7  107.2  1545.8 74.1 1405.7 140.1 6898.7 111.3 1837.5 72.4 2986.7 85.7
2001 12388.6  7770.0  43.3 4618.6  198.8 4618.6   3300.0 -52.2 1441.0 -21.6  1160.0  -61.2
 
 
  The tax-for-fee reform significantly reduced township non-budget discretionary 
revenues. The estimated extra-budgetary revenue, township general fund, and village 
retention declined respectively from 6,898.7 thousand, 1,837.5 thousand, and 2,986.7 
thousand in 2000 to 3,300 thousand, 1,441 thousand, and 1,160 thousand in 2001 
respectively, which resulted in a total reduction of 5,823 thousand
26 in 2001. 
Consequently, the making-up of revenue resources fell almost completely on the 
agricultural taxes, which were at the sole discretion of township governments. The 
agricultural taxes were, therefore, expected to be tripled from 1,545.8 thousand in 2000 to 
4,618.6 thousand in the estimated budget of 2001. 
                                                 
26 (6,898.7 thousand -3,300 thousand) + (1,837.5 thousand -1,441 thousand) + (2,986.7 - 1,160 thousand) 
=5,822.1 thousand (Table 3)    35
Chart 1 compares the township revenue make-up in 1990, 1996, and 2001. 
Clearly, township finance in Jiangsu, an affluent area, also mainly relies on taxes and 
charges on peasants in the form of agricultural taxes, extra-budget income, and township 
and village charges. The ban on charging fees and other irregular levies, stipulated by the 
central policy, drove township governments to fill the financial gap by squeezing 
collection of agricultural tax, which was also completely borne by farmers. 
 


















  The above analysis leads us to question the effectiveness of the tax-for-fee reform 
which was aimed at alleviating peasants’ financial burden. As the central government 
faces persistent peasant revolts that are threatening social and political instability, 
“alleviating peasant financial burdens” has landed at the top of the political agenda.  The 
central government reintroduced the tax-for-fee reform in a full scale in early 2003. 
Although our data is not updated to reflect the recent rural tax and fee policies, it is 
reasonable to estimate that the reform reduces the tax burdens on farmers at great   36
expenses of further weakening township fiscal capacities which in turn undermines 
farmers’ welfare. As we found out in 2001, townships in Jiangsu literally stopped 
financing expenditures on voluntary soldiers, people’s militia, and subsidies to five 
guaranteed families and needy families. There are good reasons to be skeptical, as long as 
there is no mechanism to prevent upper levels in the bureaucracy from imposing 
unfunded spending responsibilities on the townships.
 27  
  
III. C  Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations between the County and Townships 
Generally, townships are heavily dependent on transfers from the county 
governments. In poor areas of the country, township finance is quite common to be 
directly managed by the county government, and township government is literally 
degraded as a department of the county government. From 1994 to 1999, 
intergovernmental transfers between the county and this township were still defined by an 
incremental contract, i.e., based on a baseline (according to the revenue of 1993) that was 
mutually agreed between the county and township, the township government remitted an 
amount with an annual increase of six percent to the county. Township governments 
could retain all the excess revenue collected.  
Since the budget law strictly forbade local fiscal deficit in China (Budget Law, 
1995), the transfer or remittance between county and township could be roughly 
estimated by the difference between the township budgetary expenditure and the 
budgetary revenue (column E in Table 4).   
                                                 
27 See Bernstein and Lü [2000] for a remuneration of cases.    37
 Table 4 shows that the budgetary expenditure (budgetary revenue net of 
remittance to the county) at the discretion of township government was barely enough to 
cover the payroll entitlements (column A in Table 4).  Expenditure assignments other 
than payroll were to be financed by sources other than budgetary income.  As a result, all 
the expenditures except payroll had to be financed by either extra-budgetary revenue or 
various levies at the township level.  
Table 4  Streamline of Expenditure and Revenue Categories (Thousand Yuan) 

































1990 385.6  150.3  1758.3 981.9  -776.4 455.0 413.8  1071.0  1071.0 
1991 385.3  258.0  537.4 915.6 378.2 1275.0 543.6  1275.0  1275.0 
1992 646.9  282.8  1043.4  1047.5  4.1 521.4 521.4  1293.0  1293.0 
1993 799.4  349.6  1264.0  1156.0  -108.0 558.0 582.0  1313.5  1313.5 
1994 874.5  473.5  1571.0  1615.0  44.0 852.0 852.0 1394.0  1394.0 
1995 1426.9  606.3  1659.2 1818.5  159.3 1291.7 1290.2 1431.7  1431.7 
1996 1368.3  644.0  1763.3 2575.0  811.7 2356.9 2356.9 1553.5  1553.5 
1997 1582.9  920.9  2043.1 2897.8  854.7 2983.4 2983.4 2674.2  2674.2 
1998 2011.0  1001.3  2096.7 3168.6 1071.9 2786.7 2786.7 2674.2  2674.2 
1999 3077.4  1075.4  3059.4 3536.8  477.4 3265.1 3265.1 2674.2  2674.2 
2000 8012.7  1498.8  5540.9 7037.5 1496.6 6877.5 6898.7 4824.2  4824.2 
2001 10260  460.0  8530.2  12388.6  3858.4 2431.5  3300.0  2601.0  2601.0 
 
The tax assignment system was not introduced at the township level in Jiangsu 
until 2000 due to the lag of implementation as the reform went down along the hierarchy. 
The county had the sole discretion to structure the revenue sharing scheme with 
townships in the absence of any clear expenditure assignments in place between the two 
levels of governments. The sharing method since 2000 is more analogous to a contract 
scheme rather than a tax assignment formula. While the old sharing regime is effective,   38
township governments must remit 20 percent of the increment of total industrial and 
commercial taxes to the county, with the year of 2000 as the base year. The budgeted 
remittances to the county were substantially increased for 2000 and 2001, creating a 
larger gap between budgetary expenditure and total payroll. And the county could and did 
devolve more expenditures down to the townships in response to its own budget 
constraints as a result of revenue centralization of the upper echelons of government.  
 
III. D  Township Debt 
In the absence of effective township elections (more or less in some areas than in 
others)
28 that theoretically could restrain governments’ excessive taxing power, township 
governments are actively engaged in various fund-raising activities for projects to boost 
local economies. Also, township governments, faced with financial stress and the central 
mandate to balance budget, have innovated a variety of approaches to hide their deficit. 
One of the major approaches is “empty circulated revenues” (Caizheng Kongzhuan) 
which is partly financed by bank loans (Zhao 2004). In the 1990s, townships have 
accumulated large amount of debts that to various extent have incurred to individuals.  
In 2000, the 1,590 townships in Yuan’nan incurred a total debt of 3.82 billion 
yuan which meant that the average township had a debt level of 3.3 million yuan. The 
structure of this debt consisted of three parts: circulating funds borrowed from the upper-
level governments, loans from banks, and loans from various departments and the private 
sector. Townships in Qinghai in 1999 were also heavily indebted, with 3.394 million 
yuan of bank loans, 0.85 million yuan of fund loans, 0.25 million yuan of planned loan 
                                                 
28 For case studies, see Zhong [1996] and Li [2002].   39
and 7.15 million yuan in loans from other sources. Besides the explicit debt, the 
townships also had a large number of implicit debts including arrears in water and 
electrical bills and staff wages. In Jilin Province, the combined township governments 
had a total debt of 1.31 billion yuan in 2000. By end of March of 2001, the unpaid salary 
of township government was 46.6 million yuan [Bai 2002]. 
Table 5 summarizes the debt situation of a township in our case. The debts are 
categorized into bank debt, fund-raising debt including Rural Cooperative Fund (nongcun 
xinyong hezuoshe) debt, debt to individuals, political investment debt (debt incurred due 
to failed investment in boosting political performance) (zhengji touzi zhaiwu), and other 
debts (mostly resulting from the generation of arenas or IOUs). All figures are the total 
balance of each debt category for the current year. Accumulated government debt for this 
township increased from 1,563.4 thousand in 1990 to 14,900 thousand in 2001. Among 
total government debt, the share of bank debt gradually decreased from around 60 percent 
to around 30 percent. Debts incurred from fund-raising
29 increased very rapidly, from 
430.9 thousand in 1995 to 4,000 thousand in 2001. Its share in total debt increased from 
9.8 percent in 1995 to 42.6 percent in 1999 and decreased to 26.8 percent in 2001. The 
declining share of fund-raising debt was largely explained by the sharp increase of bank 
and other debts in the same period. Since 2000, township A also incurred 2,035.3 
                                                 
29 Development projects, regulatory and administrative undertakings can all be financed by fund-raising, 
which “supposed to be voluntary but often took the form of compulsory assessment or apportionment 
(tanpai) on households [Bernstein and Lü 2000].    40
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1990 40379    1563.4  930   633.4
1991 40768    1612.4  1060         552.4
1992 40690    1798.5  1100         698.5
1993 40975    2953.0  1820         1133
1994 40926  1435.8  3067.7  1760         1307.7
1995 40884  2161.2  4408.4  2000 430.9 430.9     1977.5
1996 41127  4468.6  5951.3  2200 1059.9 1059.9     2691.4
1997 41029  4821.5  7268.6  2910 1219 1219     3139.6
1998 41051  4995.5  10684.9  2760 4406.2 4406.2   3518.7
1999 41060  5506.6  9468.1  2344 4032.8 4032.8     3091.3
2000 68655  5262.8  15114.3  5109.2 4456 1718 2035.3   5549.1
2001 68700  5895.2  14900.0  5200 4000 1500 1700   5700
        Percentage share of debt category in total debt 
    
Percentage share of sub-debt category in 
fund-raising debt     
1990     100  59.5   40.5
1991     100  65.7         34.3
1992     100  61.2         38.8
1993     100  61.6         38.4
1994     100  57.4         42.6
1995     100  45.4 9.8 100     44.9
1996     100  37.0 17.8 100   45.2
1997     100  40.0 16.8 100     43.2
1998     100  25.8 41.2 100     32.9
1999     100  24.8 42.6 100   32.6
2000     100  33.8 29.5 38.6 45.7   36.7
2001     100  34.9 26.8 37.5 42.5   38.3
 
IV.  TAX FARMING AND PEASANT REVOLTS 
The tax farming system has deprived peasants from sharing in the fruits of reform 
and development, with urban-dwellers gaining higher income but paying less taxes; the 
tax farming system has also spoiled local cadres in their power abuse and corruption in 
the absence of any accountability schemes from below. When residents in Beijing are 
complaining about the impact of high percentage of private car ownership on city 
                                                 
30 Based on the original numbers reported by the township governments, the calculated shares of debt to 
RCF and individuals for some townships don’t add up to 100 percent of total fund-raising debt. We will 
keep them the way as they reported.    41
transportation, and when the village cadres are enjoying mobile phones, good meals and 
houses, peasants live hopelessly in the vast rural lands where the toilers may depend on 
giving blood to make a living [Chen and Wu 2004].  
Several features of China’s fiscal system elevate the potential for peasant revolts.  
First, tax farming, in its exploitative nature, allows each level of government to devolve 
expenses downward and centralize revenues upward, ultimately leaving the bottom level 
of the hierarchy, townships, financially starved.  Second, the central government’s 
attempt to restrain the excess local taxing powers by requiring them to keep a balanced 
budget only results in the proliferation of informal charges and fees on peasants in the 
absence of horizontal accountability mechanisms.  “The notion of balance formalized 
implicit social understandings about the acceptable levels of taxing and spending,” and 
the growth of spending is restrained by “social expectations about limits and by the level 
of taxation considered tolerable” [Webber and Wildavsky 1986, p. 331]. While in a 
democratic institution, the level of tolerance can be expressed by local political 
participation or “voting with feet,” two important channels of restraining local taxing 
power, such expression is simply a luxury in a hierarchical unitary state and “the 
balanced budget norm could be construed (and was, by hierarchical regimes) as an 
invitation to raise taxes” [Webber and Wildavsky 1986, p. 331]. It is the case in China. 
The norms of balanced budgets justify the raising of taxes or instituting new ones when 
large increase of local government spending incurs. Moreover, the balance requirement 
induced a vigorous pursuit of extra-budgetary funds, fees, and irregular levies which 
provide financing for a major proportion of local expenditures. These non-budgetary 
resources are not reported and monitored by the budget, further exacerbating the problem   42
of information asymmetry between the Center and subnational governments.  Third, in 
the lack of horizontal accountability of local governments to their residents, local 
governments face few, if any, checks against their abuse of power. Instead, the current 
cadre system of direct appointment tends to make local officials mostly accountable to 
the upper/central government authorities, which has induced the indulgence of 
government entertaining activities, prevalence of white elephant projects, high rate of 
corruption, and inefficient public services provision. As local officials are not restrained 
by any form of citizen oversight in the current system, they enthusiastically pursue visible 
economic performance as effort to get rated and promoted at the expenses of bankrupt 
local government and poor basic service delivery. Furthermore, the central government 
lacks the infrastructure and financial resources to enforce policy mandates, and also faces 
a dilemma of separating its agents’ efforts to collect taxes from their ability to exploit 
taxpayers and peasants. The result is a fiscal system that exploits farmers through 
numerous illegal charges and fess but delivers inadequate levels of public goods and 
services.  
  Peasant resent “the number of taxes and various supplementary charges and 
levies that are imposed haphazardly and even illegally, in order to fund, or under the 
pretext of funding, some particular project or other” [Bianco 2001, p. 249]. Even when 
Vice Premier, now Premier, Wen Jiabao pronounced the Center’s ban on the local 
governments’ excessive levies, the dictum did not prevent subnational government units 
from enthusiastically engaging in arbitrary levies, fines, compulsory contributions,   43
various apportionments (tanpai), and fund-raising activities, all of which remained the 
major reason for excessive financial burdens of peasants.
31  
The increasing mobility of China’s rural population, a phenomenon that was 
considered relatively inconsequential a decade ago, failed to restrain local government’s 
excess taxing power in China. Theoretically, higher mobility should have an effect 
equivalent to “voting with their feet” that would restrain the excess tax power of local 
officials, who fear to lose tax bases than otherwise would be [Brennan and Buchanan 
1980, Stein 2000]. But in China, the problem resides in the general tendency of farmers 
to maintain strong roots in rural areas while seeking wealth in the urban cities
32. Aware of 
the uncertain economic prospects in the city, the “floating” population keep strong 
connections to families left behind, and their ties to ancestral land sustain these rural-
urban ties.  However, the repatriation of their urban income makes their rural relatives 
more vulnerable to exploitation by local officials.  
When the financial burden reaches a perilous limit, peasants seek various ways to 
resist through protests, litigation, or violent incidents. For instance, the villagers of 
Duzhuhu in Huangyu district have devised a set of signals to escape from tax collection – 
they bang a copper cymbal when a tax collection team is spotted coming from the west of 
the villag; and a whistle is blowed if the team is approaching from the east. At the sign, 
all the peasants grab any weapons they can and run out to attack the tax collectors [Chen 
and Wu 2004]. Spontaneous protests, often flaring into violence, appear to have taken 
                                                 
31 Xinhua News Agency, 28 September 2000 
32 Premier Wen Jiabao pointed out that although an increasing number of peasants are now pursuing their 
personal developments in urban cities, the piece of land in their rural hometown remained to be their 
ultimate “social safety net” (Renmin Ribao, February 8, 2003).   44
place in many provinces. In Zizhou, Shaanxi, tax protester broke into a government 
building and took 40,000 yuan (USD 5,000). Mr. Ma Yenlin, leader of the protest, was 
sentenced to jail for five years. Farmers subsequently submitted a petition to Shaanxi 
Province High Court, with 30,116 signatures protesting against the 'unjust treatment' of 
Mr. Ma. [China News Digest 2000]. In Daolin, Hunan, after a man allegedly killed 
himself due to increased taxes, thousands of peasants marched to the local government 
office, which ended using tear gas to disperse crowds [Los Angeles Times 1999].   
Just as peasants’ revolts are getting harsh, suppressions by local officials are no 
less mercy. Chen and Wu [2004] document that if the peasants have no money to hand, 
the “tax collection team”, under the leadership of the village Party Secretary, will 
confiscate their pigs, furniture, grain and machinery; and in case of resistance, the team 
may call in the security forces and have the peasants beaten up, arrested or imprisoned.  
Some Chinese officials have suggested strong repression as the best response. Wu 
Shuangzhan and Sui Mingtai, commander and commissar of the paramilitary People's 
Armed Police wrote a joint article in January 2006 urging training and preparation to put 
down the rural unrest. The senior leadership, while not discarding use of force, has been 
focusing more on tackling farmers' underlying problems as the long-term solution [Cody 
2006]. 
 
IV.A  Fiscal Policies Create Dilemmas for both Townships Officials and the Center   
The quandary faced by township officials is to finance an astounding range of 
unfunded mandates with scarce revenue sources. In addition to their locally initiated   45
projects, township governments are responsible for the development and administration 
of TVEs, local agricultural projects, public works such as irrigation systems, forestry and 
flood control, township education, population control, public security, and people’s 
militia [Zhong 1996]. It is not surprising that township officials resort to fees, surcharges, 
and other irregularities in order to get their ends meet.  Unauthorized local taxes may not 
necessarily imply intentional corruption but reflect that “local governments in poorer 
areas, given their lack of profitable enterprises, expertise, and market outlets, are more 
susceptible to parasitic and extracting practices” [Bianco 2001].     
The combination of a decentralized fiscal system and a hierarchical political 
structure creates a dilemma for government officials at higher levels to distinguish proper 
conduct of local agents from corrupted practices.  The administrative lever of subnational 
echelons allows them to extract revenues and devolve expenditures not only to ease own 
budget constraints, but also use unfunded mandates to counter the tendency of each lower 
layer to conceal revenues from upper levels. As the tier of bureaucrats (or agents) 
continues to press the peasants for the agents’ organizational or personal gains, their 
misconduct fuels rampant social dissatisfaction.  Should tax protests catalyze rural revolts,
 
33 they would nullify the central government’s efforts to control local society. If the 
central government attempted to exercise control over the townships through its fiscal 
policies, it simply did not succeed. 
 
                                                 
33 The increasing threat of peasant revolts to political and social stability in the countryside can be reflected 
in the Chinese leaders’ escalating rhetoric of alleviating the financial burdens of peasants. For example, the 
former premier Zhu Rongji, on his fact-finding tour to Jiangsu Provinces in April 2000, stressed that 
alleviating the financial burdens of peasants was “not only an important economic issue, but also a serious 
political issue”  (Sina Financial News, 21 April 2000). Xinhua News Agency (28 September 2000) reported 
the urgent call from Vice Premier Wen Jiabao for alleviating peasants’ financial burden.    46
VI.B  Paradoxical Approaches of the Center  
The Center’s increasingly dependence on its local/grassroots governments to 
control local society has produced paradoxical approaches in addressing the concerns 
raised in peasant revolts. On one hand, the Center tends to sympathize with the peasants 
when they appeal to the Center for reducing financial burdens [Bernstein 2002]. Its 
gesture of appeasement has fostered the perception among rural Chinese that their 
protests have a better chance of extracting policy reforms when they circumvent lower 
levels and proceed upward through the state [Li and O’Brien 1996]. A popular saying in 
rural China summarizes how the peasants view their relationships with the state and its 
bureaucratic agents at various hierarchical levels: “The center is our benefactor (enren), 
the province is our relative, the county is a good person, the township is an evil person, 
and the village is our enemy” [Zhang and Meng 1993]. This saying vividly captures the 
hierarchically exploitative nature of China’s fiscal system.  Peasants perceive that the 
farther the government level is away from them, the less evil its officials are. On the other 
hand, in spite of its inability to control the behavior of subnational agents, the central 
government seems extremely reserved about promoting political reforms that would 
permit greater local political participation.  In the 2001 National People’s Congress (NPC) 
session, the then President Jiang Zemin made it clear that the present system of self-
government at the village level would not extend to other jurisdictions [Li 2002].  
The Center’s paradoxical approach is merely a reflection of the state’s shifting 
coalitions between the peasants and its local agents, depending on whether the Center is 
keener to collect popular support to limit the financial extraction of its agents at one time   47
or more compelled to rely on local agents to control local society when peasant revolts 
stir up social unrest [Tilly 1975, p. 24].
34     
The current leadership has followed the rhetoric of the previous government in 
making policies, which now seek to balance economic development and ease income 
inequality by investing in the hinterland and revitalizing the old industrial bases in 
Northeast. Premier Wen Jiabao’s surprise visits to various peasant families in the rural 
areas resulted in the payment of long overdue wages.
35 These visits were widely reported 
in the press and seemed to usher a renewed sense of concern for peasants specifically and 
China’s rural areas in general.  However, the rampant levies of local governments that 
drive the peasants to economic and sometimes physical tragedy cannot be curbed without 
a systematic cure for an institutionalized political participation at the grassroots level.  In 
doing so, this political reform would serve to check and restrain local governments’ 
excessive taxing power from bottom up. 
Apart from installing horizontal accountability mechanisms, the alternatives for 
the Center are few and fiscal reforms have demonstrated their limits. On the expenditure 
side, for example, the Center can define clearly the expenditure assignments for itself, 
provinces, prefectures, counties and townships. This policy may be effective in curbing 
the devolution of expenditures. But clarifying expenditure assignments between levels of 
governments may ultimately restrain the Center itself; hence, it is unlikely to be a central 
policy choice for the time being. The central authorities may also have the option of 
                                                 
34 For a discussion of “a game of shifting coalitions” in the context of Europe in transition from feudalism 
to modern society, see Charles Tilly ed., The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1975). 
35 A widely publicized report is that Premier Wen Jiabao helped a farmer named Xiong Deming get back 
her overdue one-year salary from the county officials, reported by Zhang Tianwei, Beijing Qingnian Bao 
(Beijing Youth Daily), 28 October 2003.    48
centralizing control of expenditures to the Center. But the feasibility of this policy is 
questionable. First, with the tax assignment reform in 1994 aimed at revenue 
centralization, the consolidation of expenditure may raise the suspicion that the central 
government seeks to return to a centralized fiscal system similar to the pre-reform one. 
Such a system is inefficient, not only as suggested by the theoretical literature, but also as 
demonstrated by China’s pre-reform experience. Second, China, as “a state with modest 
resources and limited administrative capacity” is not able to survive financially without 
certain levels of local charge fees for services [Webber and Wildavsky 1986, p. 133].  
On the revenue side, since the Center has the exclusive say on tax rates and tax 
bases since the 1994 tax assignment reform, some economists suggest assigning the 
subnational governments more discretion over local tax bases and rates, hoping that this 
may allow localities to finance the unfunded mandates with less dependence on illegal 
fees, borrowings, and central transfers [Ahmad 2003]. However, in the absence of an 
institutionalized bottom-up mechanism (e.g., local political participation) to hold local 
governments accountable, this policy runs the risk of “legalizing” illegal fees in the form 
of taxes, as long as the subnational mandates require funding that considerably exceeds 
their currently available resources. 
While democratic institutions may ultimately help to restrict local taxing power, 
the internal transformation of the bureaucratic culture is also necessary. China maintains 
an egalitarian bureaucracy which is open to students regardless of their social background 
through civil service examinations. However, once becoming part of the bureaucracy, 
they are more seduced to exploit the tax system for personal interests than develop public 
service ethos.  In other words, this egalitarian gentry examination system allows the   49
previously “ruled” to become the bureaucratic “ruler,” and thus effectively undermines 
the demand for the creation of pluralistic institutions in China.   
V. CONCLUSTION 
In conclusion, a political hierarchy financed by a tax-farming fiscal system in 
China has the advantage of ensuring revenue flows to the Center in the early years, but it 
ultimately restrains the Center financially and fails to contain the exploitative behavior of 
local officials. The central government is plagued with undulating reactions of 
decentralization, when spurring local tax collection resides as the top priority, and 
recentralization, when strengthening central control over fiscal resources is needed. The 
real peril of the system lies in (1) an unrestrained central government that devolves 
inappropriate share of expenditure mandates to sub-national levels; and (2) the principle-
agent problem as a result of the splitting property rights over taxation: the Center has 
ownership over all tax bases, while the agents take charge of tax collection and have 
effective control over the extra revenues generated from the same tax bases. The agents, 
with no interest in preserving the tax bases for the Center, take on un-funded mandates, 
and their personal pecuniary interests tempt them to further extract revenues from the 
lowerarchies. “Ultimately, the people paid” [Webber and Wildavsky 1986, p. 133]. Poor 
peasants bear the brunt of the tax burden. As the financial pressure of excessive levies 
and fees reaches a perilous point, peasants are resorting to violent protests.  
China’s current leadership has taken a series of actions, culminating in the 
initiative of building a new socialist countryside, as efforts to pacify the mounting 
grievances in the countryside and strengthen its grip on power. In particular, the Tax-for-  50
Fee reform aimed at alleviating farmers’ financial burden will abolish the agricultural 
taxes universally by 2006. However, the impact of the reform may be not as promising as 
expected, at least manifested by the township finance examined in this paper. 
International experience suggests that greater local revenue autonomy should be 
considered as an important reform in putting decentralization to work at the local level. In 
future a great challenge is to establish land and property taxes as the main tax base for 
county and township governments in China.  
Also, it is keen to think about the definition of national minimal standards and 
means to ensure sufficient local finance for implementation in such areas as nine years 
compulsory education, basic medical treatment, and essential unemployment 
compensation and survivor and dependent insurance. The wide and growing divergence 
in basic public services between rural and urban areas has not only dented social fairness 
but also endangers country’s cohesiveness. Although the equalization transfer system can 
be taken as an important approach to address the issue of regional disparity, China indeed 
relies on the center to guarantee all citizens have access to basic public service through 
setting national minimal standards and centralizing basic public services to some extent. 
Most of governments at and under county levels lack capacity to adequately provide 
basic public services; and assigning sub-national governments the primary role in basic 
public services provision also cause the equity problem due to the wide-ranging fiscal 
capacity among regions.  
Furthermore, the country’s ability to sustain a centralized polity with a fiscally 
decentralized system may become increasingly undermined in the absence of any 
horizontal accountability mechanisms. The lack of accountability of sub-national   51
government officials to local residents undermines the potential efficiency gains from 
decentralization reforms. The current cadre system of direct appointment makes local 
officials mostly accountable to the upper/central government authorities, which has 
induced the indulgence of government entertaining activities, prevalence of white 
elephant projects, high rate of corruption, and inefficient public services provision. 
Therefore, it is necessary to start considering how to demand transparency and 
performance of local governments to their residents by empowering the community and 
even institutions, and encouraging voices from citizens.  
China’s future is not dependent on whether we add more to those who have a 
plenty but whether we complement those who have nothing. Peasants, our under-
privileged brothers and sisters, are the marginalized we shall look after.  
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